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  Jiri Benovsky
Abstract
Merely rhetorically and answering in the negative, Kendall Walton
has asked: "Isn't photography just another method people have
of making pictures, one that merely uses different tools and
materials; cameras, photosensitive paper, and darkroom
equipment, rather than canvas, paint, and brushes? And don't
the results differ only contingently and in degree, not
fundamentally, from pictures of other kinds?"
Contrary to Walton and others, I answer with a resounding
"Yes" to Walton’s questions in this article. It is a widely shared
view that photographs are somehow special and that they
fundamentally differ from hand-made pictures such as paintings,
both from a phenomenological point of view (in the way we
experience them) and an epistemic point of view (since they are
supposed to have a different that is, greater, epistemic value
from paintings that gives us a privileged access to the world). I
almost reject the totality of these claims and, as a consequence,
there remains little difference between photographs and
paintings. As we shall see, “photographs are always partly
paintings,” a claim that is true not only of retouched digital
photographs but of all photographs, including traditional ones
made using photosensitive film and development techniques.
Keywords
digital photography, metaphysics, painting, perception,
phenomenology, photography

1. Introduction
Merely rhetorically and answering in the negative, Kendall
Walton[1] has asked: "Isn't photography just another method
people have of making pictures, one that merely uses different
tools and materials; cameras, photosensitive paper, darkroom
equipment, rather than canvas, paint, and brushes? And don't
the results differ only contingently and in degree, not
fundamentally, from pictures of other kinds?"
Contrary to Walton and others, I answer with a resounding "Yes"
to Walton’s questions. It is a widely shared view that
photographs are somehow special and that they fundamentally
differ from hand-made pictures such as paintings, both from a
phenomenological point of view (in the way we experience them)
and an epistemic point of view (since they are supposed to have
a different, that is, greater, epistemic value than paintings that
gives us a privileged access to the world). I almost reject the
totality of these claims, and as a consequence there remains
little difference between photographs and paintings. As we shall
see, “photographs are always partly paintings,” a claim that is
true not only of retouched digital photographs but of all
photographs, including traditional ones made using
photosensitive film and development techniques.
2. Perception of pictures

Let me start with something that has nothing to do with
photography but that concerns ordinary perception. Suppose
you see a bottle of beer on a table in front of you. Setting aside
sceptical scenarios (hallucinations, Descartes' evil demons, and
the like), what you see, according to many standard ontologies,
is the bottle of beer because there is a bottle of beer in front of
you, and your perception is somehow caused by the bottle
(along with other factors involving light, your eyes, your optic
nerve, and so on). Eliminativism is a metaphysical theory that
comes in many different varieties but all of them have in
common the claim that entities such as bottles of beer do not
exist.[2]
According to eliminativism, there are only fundamental
components arranged bottle-of-beer-wise. The nature of these
fundamental components is subject to controversy and varies
from one version of eliminativism to another (particles,
properties, or other); for our current purposes let us simply call
them 'atoms.' The central claim of eliminativism is, then, that
atoms arranged bottle-of-beer-wise can do all the metaphysical
work bottles of beer can do, and consequently bottles of beer
can be eliminated from our ontology without any loss of
explanatory power. For instance, bottles of beer can be bought
and sold, they can be used as weights on a paperback book on a
windy day, or they can occupy a rather well-defined spatiotemporal region in your fridge – but atoms arranged bottle-ofbeer-wise can do all of that too. No need then to postulate extra
entities, namely bottles of beer, in one's ontology.
Furthermore, eliminativists typically claim that their view is not
contrary to common sense and that it actually is a rather
intuitive one. This is where an objection concerning ordinary
perception comes into the picture. Indeed, on the one hand
eliminativists say that there are no bottles of beer but on the
other hand they want to say that we see them even when we are
not under an evil demon's influence or hallucinating. This is a
seeming contradiction. The correct reply to this worry, nicely put
by Trenton Merricks, is the simple but significant claim that our
experience is the same whether there is a bottle of beer in front
of us or whether there are atoms arranged bottle-of-beerwise.[3]
Thus, the phenomenal character of our experience is neutral in
relation to the eliminativist's metaphysical claim. Our experience
is caused, in short, by light reflected by a bottle of beer, and
since atoms arranged bottle-of-beer-wise reflect light in the
same way bottles of beer do, our experience is qualitatively the
same in both cases. The fact that we have non-hallucinatory
perceptions of bottles of beer thus cannot be used as an
argument against eliminativism. The general idea here is that
our sensory experiences can be accounted for by more basic and
genuinely fundamental (and existing) entities, such as atoms
arranged x-wise. This means there is no need to postulate a
further entity such as x.
In this paper, I am not interested in eliminativism but I am
interested in what the situation described above teaches us
about phenomenology. What it teaches us is that
phenomenology parts ways from epistemology or metaphysics.
Whether we know that there are (or aren't) bottles of beer or
whether there are any (or not) simply does not matter for what

our experience is like. Beliefs we have about what there is and
how things are are irrelevant to what we see (perceive, in
general) in a purely qualitative and phenomenal sense. The
eliminativist's response to the objection above illustrates this
point nicely, I think. Beliefs do not intervene in what we see.
Now we can talk about photographs. A first, simple, and
perhaps even trivial claim I want to put on the table is the
following: photographs and paintings are both pictures and are
both experienced in the particular way in which pictures are, but
there is no significant difference in our visual experience when
we look at a photograph or at a painting. What we see is simply
a picture. Whether a picture is a sharp photograph or a hyperrealistic painting, or whether it is a digitally manipulated, heavily
retouched photograph or an impressionist painting, our visual
experience may be the same; indeed, for the viewer these cases
may sometimes be visually (that is, phenomenally)
indistinguishable.[4]
The point here is not to say that we can make mistakes
(although we can) and take a photograph to be a painting or a
painting to be a photograph. Rather, what I want to highlight
here is the fact that our visual experiences qua phenomenal
visual experiences are of the same kind: they are visual
experiences of pictures. This simple fact shows us that, here
again, our phenomenology exists apart from what we know about
the picture (especially about the way it was produced) or from
the way the picture is (its metaphysical nature).
What I want to do here is to clearly distinguish between
phenomenological issues on the one hand and epistemic and
metaphysical ones on the other. This is not always the case, as
for instance Robert Hopkins and Mikael Pettersson both recently
put it, independently of each other:
[Traditional] photographs have an epistemic status
that “handmade” pictures such as drawings,
paintings, and etchings do not. (Hopkins [5]) Both
photographs and handmade pictures can be sources
of knowledge, but photographs offer us a way of
finding out about the world that is more secure than
that offered by handmade pictures....[T]his
epistemological difference is accompanied by a
difference in phenomenology: we experience
photographs differently from the way in which we
experience other pictures. Photographs seem to put
us in a relationship to the objects they depict in a
way that is somehow more intimate and direct than
the relationship we bear to the objects that
handmade pictures depict....What we see in
traditional photographs is, of necessity, true to how
things were when the photograph was taken....It is
this that explains traditional photography's special
epistemic status and the special experience it
instills. (Hopkins [6])
[M]ore than whether photographs actually provide
epistemic access to what they depict, it is viewers'
beliefs that they do so that matter for the
phenomenology of photography. (Pettersson [7])
The link between phenomenology and epistemology is obvious in

both citations. Both Hopkins and Pettersson mention the
influence one's beliefs allegedly have on one's phenomenal
experience when perceiving a photograph. But as I tried to show
above, it is a mistake to mix the two issues in this way. What we
see (that is, what the phenomenal character of our visual
experience is like) is one thing, and what we believe to be the
case about what we see is another. Perhaps I am insisting too
much on the trivial, and perhaps I am not interpreting the
citations above in a charitable way. But perhaps once we do
make the conceptual distinction between phenomenology,
epistemology, and metaphysics more precisely, we will have a
better starting point for the discussion of the alleged differences
between photographs and paintings; namely, we learn that it is
not a phenomenological affair, but an epistemic and
metaphysical one. These are the claims to which I will turn my
attention.
3. Photographs and reality
The difference between paintings and photographs is that,
typically in the case of photographs, when we know that we are
looking at a photograph, we have a piece of knowledge about a
metaphysical truth that we don't have in the case of paintings.
More precisely, the relevant epistemic situation is that we know
how the picture was produced, and this gives us access to a
simple but important metaphysical truth: there was something
before the camera. This is a claim that is widely shared by
virtually everyone, including Walton, Hopkins, and Pettersson.
Indeed, given the way photographs are made, it is necessary
that, at the beginning of the causal process that leads to the
existence of a photograph the is something that has been
photographed. In short, that something reflected light that was
then recorded by a camera.
Now, what I want to insist on is how weak this claim is. Let us
start by having a look at these three photographs I took of a
bottle of beer.

Photo 1: a photograph of a bottle of beer, f/29, 1sec, 28mm

Photo 2: a photograph of a bottle of beer, f/3, 1/160, 16mm

Photo 3: a photograph of a bottle of beer, f/8, 1/80, 36mm

These three photographs are of the same subject, under the
same light conditions, taken at (almost) the same time. They
are photographs of “the same metaphysical reality.” All three
are such that we have the piece of knowledge about the
metaphysical truth on which everyone agrees: something was
there. The weakness of this claim is most obviously apparent in
Photo 1 where the “something” is unrecognizable (because of a
long exposure and a shaking hand), but Photo 2 and Photo 3
illustrate the claim I want to make, as well, namely, that in the
case of a photograph, when we know that we are looking at a
photograph, we know that there was something that has been
photographed but we do not know how this something was.
Sometimes we do not even know what this something was, as in
the case of Photo 1, but this is only a matter of degree. It is
because we know so little about how it was that we are not even
able to see what it was. Always, we do not know how the
something was, for the simple reason illustrated by Photo 2 and
Photo 3, that the entities that have been photographed are
never pictorially represented (depicted, shown, visually given to
us) as they are “in the world.” Indeed, as a matter of necessity,
in any normal process of creation of a photograph, there are
steps where some features of the entities represented are
altered or even “erased” and replaced by other apparent

features.
All three photographs above, for instance, “misrepresent” the
colors of what they are photographs of since they are black and
white. Photo 2 “misrepresents” the entities located in the
background by representing them as blurred because of a
shallow depth of field. Both Photo 2 and Photo 3 “misrepresent”
the shape of the bottle (most apparent in the case of Photo 2,
but Photo 3 is actually deformed as well) because of the choice
of a particular focal length; also, all photographs always
represent what they are photographs of only from a certain
angle, and so on.
An important thing to note is that all of these
“misrepresentations” are due only to a normal use of traditional
and standard photographic techniques: aperture, shutter speed,
angle of view, focus, and focal length. Photo 2, for instance, is
thus no less normal than Photo 3, while Photo 1, relevantly, is no
less normal than the other two. It would simply be entirely
arbitrary to claim the contrary. No special effects have been
used here, only standard settings on a standard camera.[8]
Now what we see here is that even normal photographs, using
standard settings and photographic techniques, tell us in
principle very little about the “true properties” of what they
depict. The shape of the bottle, for instance, is “misrepresented”
in all three photographs above (and so are colors, sharpness,
etc.). Thus, again, since we know that we are looking at
photographs and not at paintings, we know that there was
something that was photographed but we do not know how it
was. For instance, by looking at the photograph of the bottle,
we do not see what its true shape was. We can perhaps guess
at it, or even calculate it if we know all of the settings and the
distance from which the photograph was taken, and if we know
the equations that allow such a calculation. But even if
something like this were at least partly possible, this would not
be a normal way to interact with photographs (and it would
definitely not work very well in the case of colors or of a blurred
background).
A photograph does not give us the world. It gives us a pictorial
representation that in normal and standard cases misrepresents
the world in a more-or-less interesting way. A photograph tells
us that there was a world, and in some cases (but not always, as
in Photo 1) tells us approximately how the world was. The latter
is often true of paintings, as well, and only the former
metaphysical claim constitutes a principaSl difference between
paintings and photographs since it can (but does not have to) be
false in the case of paintings.
4. Photographs and photographers
Perhaps then, as many have claimed, the difference between
photographs and paintings comes not from the resulting picture
but from the way it was produced, in the sense that photographs
are made mechanically without human intervention, while
paintings are necessarily subject to human intentions, beliefs,
and interventions (see these quotations: [9]). In a previous
article ("Three kinds of realism about photographs," 2011), I
argued at length that this is incorrect, so let me only focus on
the main point here: it is not possible not to make decisions
when one takes a photograph. Any time a photograph is made,

a decision has to be made at the very least about aperture,
shutter speed, focal length, exposure, and usually many other
settings. These decisions can be either purposefully, consciously,
and manually made by the photographer herself, or they can be
made by the engineers who programmed the automatic mode of
the camera that a Sunday snapshooter can use to avoid making
these decisions by herself. But in any case, human decisions and
human interventions are unavoidable.
These decisions make a big difference to the resulting picture, as
Photo 1, Photo 2, and Photo 3 illustrate. Indeed, the differences
among these three pictures are entirely because of my decisions.
Big aperture can be chosen to create a shallow depth of field,
resulting in a blurred background. Long exposure time can be
used to produce photographs like Photo 1. A wide angle lens
(short focal length) can be chosen to produce deformations like
those in Photo 2. And so on. These tools, as well as many
others, are the standard tools the photographer is meant to use
to produce a picture according to how she wants to represent the
metaphysical reality in front of the camera and not to how the
reality is. In the same way painters can (and often do) give us a
pictorial representation of the world according to how they want
us to see it. Photographers use the various settings and
techniques at their disposal to make us see the world the way
they want to show it.
Keeping this in mind, we see here again how weak the epistemic
and metaphysical claim is. Indeed, in the case of photographs
the claim that "there was something" is necessarily true, while it
is only contingent in the case of paintings. But that's about the
only principal difference between these two types of pictures,
and as we have seen above, it is not a big one. In both cases,
the entities that are pictorially represented are only given to us
after some human decisions have been made to represent them
in such-and-such a way.
5. Photographs and (post-)production
Furthermore, both digital and traditional photographs require a
certain amount of “post-production steps” where either a RAW
file is converted into a final image file or a negative is developed
to produce a final picture on photographic paper. These
manipulations, digital or chemical, are necessary to produce a
photograph; without them no photograph would even exist.
Indeed, after the shutter has been pressed, there is only a
negative or a RAW file, but these are not yet photographs.
Additional steps need to be taken in order to bring a photograph
into existence. These steps can be done quickly inside the body
of a camera (as in a Polaroid camera or in most compact
automatic digital cameras), or later manually (in a darkroom, or
on a computer), but this practical difference does not constitute
a principal   difference. However, if these steps are taken, and
they have to be taken, here again they involve human decisions
(either the photographer's own or somebody else's).
Minimally, these are decisions about contrast, colors, and
brightness, which are decisions that have to be taken to produce
any photograph at all. But these decisions can also concern
more sophisticated techniques in order to produce a particular
effect (such as a sepia effect, for instance) or to chemically or
digitally manipulate the negative or the RAW file to produce a
retouched photograph. Such retouches can be small and light or

they can be heavy, involving instruments used by the
photographer to finish her work; that is, to better achieve her
goal of showing us the world the way she wants us to see it.
In part, then, these manipulations are necessary. They are an
essential part of any normal process of creating a photograph.
Partly they are contingent and the photographer can choose to
take such additional steps or she can choose not to do so. How
many such steps must be taken before the resulting picture
ceases to be a photograph and becomes a painting is a vague
matter.[10] But long before we reach that limit, we are in a
position to see that the mere existence of any normal
photograph requires some amount of post-production technique
and human decision, and that in standard cases the amount of
chemical or digital manipulation goes well beyond these minimal
necessary steps. As before, we see here again how human
intervention plays a crucial role in photographs coming into
existence and in the picture that results; a way that tells us not
how the world is but rather how the photographer wants us to
see it.
6. Photographs are always partly paintings
What stems from the preceding sections, I hope, is a clear
picture of the nature of photographs and of the way we produce
them, experience them, and interact with them. I hope it is
clear enough to render the following claim obvious: photographs
are always partly paintings.
The photographer deals with a metaphysical reality in front of
her camera (and the difference between her and a painter
concerns the fact that this is necessary for her and only
contingent for the painter), and uses the various photographic
tools and techniques at her disposal to create a pictorial
representation of that reality. These tools are such that they
require her to make important decisions. Thus, even if she
wanted to, she could never simply represent reality. Rather, she
necessarily has to misrepresent it, and by making such-and-such
a decision rather than another, she shows us the world, again,
not as it is but as she decided to show it. Photo 1, Photo 2, and
Photo 3 are examples of such decisions. Thus, not only
photographs always partly paintings, but photographers are
always partly painters. This is true even of those who limit
themselves to the strict (and necessary) minimum when it
comes to post-production.
What all of this shows us is how small the principal difference is
between photographs and paintings.[11]   Of course, they are
pictures produced using different tools (in a narrow sense, a
painting is made using paint and is, in this sense, trivially
different from a photograph), and the epistemic and
metaphysical claim "We know that there was something" is only
contingent in the case of paintings. Furthermore, when it comes
to paintings, a change in the reality will only make a difference
for the painting if it also makes a difference in how the painter
sees the reality. In the case of photographs, a change in the
reality will make a difference in the photograph even if, say, it
goes unnoticed by the photographer. This is true provided that
the change is big enough to be visually noticeable in the
resulting picture.
Despite these differences, we have seen that, first, there is no

phenomenological difference between these two types of
pictures. That is, there is no difference in the qualitative
experiences we have of them and, second, the metaphysical
claim is a weak one. The weakness of this claim, I suppose, will
become more obvious and significant with the evolution of digital
photography, because the ease with which digital manipulation
can be done during production and post-production will make
photographers become even more painters than they already
are.[12]
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